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Summary of Papers Presented at 
the Second Conference of 
the International Research Forum 
on Monetary Policy 
Gregg Forte, of the Board’s Division of Research and 
Statistics, prepared this article. 
The  International  Research  Forum  on  Monetary 
Policy held its second conference on November 14 
and 15, 2003. The organization is sponsored by the 
European Central Bank (ECB); the Board of Gov­
ernors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System  (FRB);  the 
Center for German and European Studies (CGES), at 
Georgetown University, in Washington, D.C.; and the 
Center  for  Financial  Studies  (CFS),  at  the  Goethe 
University, in Frankfurt. It was formed to encourage 
research on monetary policy issues that are relevant 
from a global perspective, and it organizes confer­
ences that are held alternately in the euro area and the 
United States. 
The 2003 conference, held in Washington, D.C., 
featured  ten  papers.1  Among  the  topics  examined 
were the Great Inﬂation of the 1970s in the United 
States and the inﬂuence of learning, or adjustment 
of  expectations,  on  policy  outcomes;  the  tradeoffs 
between rules-based and discretionary monetary pol-
icy; the 1999 formation of the European Economic 
and Monetary Union and whether it altered the degree 
of  economic  integration  between  the  United  States 
and  the  euro  area;  the  potential  beneﬁts  of  greater 
competition in the euro area; and optimal monetary 
policy  in  an  international  setting.  This  summary 
discusses  the  papers  in  the  order  presented  at  the 
conference.2 
Note.  The author of this article thanks Dale Henderson and the 
authors of the conference papers for their assistance in its prepara­
tion and Christopher J. Erceg, Glenn Follette, Christopher J. Gust, 
Daniel E. Sichel, and Robert J. Tetlow for helpful comments. 
1.  The  organizers  of  the  forum’s  2003  conference  were  Ignazio 
Angeloni  (ECB),  Matthew  Canzoneri  (CGES),  Dale  Henderson 
(FRB), and Volker Wieland (CFS). 
2.  A list of the papers appears at the end of this article along with 
an alphabetical list of authors and their afﬁliations at the time of the 
conference.  For  a  limited  period,  the  papers  will  be  available  at 
www.federalreserve.gov/events/conferences/irfmp2003/default.htm. 
In  addition,  a  revised  version  of  each  conference  paper  will  be 
available  in  one  of  the  following  series  of  working  papers:  the 
INFORMATION AND LEARNING 
In  the  conference’s  ﬁrst  session,  ‘‘Information  and 
Learning,’’  two  papers  considered  the  conduct  of 
monetary policy during the high inﬂation and high 
unemployment  (stagﬂation)  of  the  1970s.  In  both 
papers, the authors note the wide agreement today 
that underlying productivity growth had fallen in the 
early 1970s and that monetary policy was too accom­
modative given the resultant narrowing of the output 
and unemployment gaps. Fabrice Collard and Harris 
Dellas create a model that can explain the conduct of 
monetary policy in the 1970s if the central bank is 
fairly insensitive both to expectations of rising inﬂa­
tion and to any perception of a wide output gap and is 
also highly uncertain about potential output. 
Athanasios Orphanides and John C. Williams trace 
the  high-inﬂation  episode  to  monetary  policy  mis­
takes that had started earlier, in the mid-1960s. They 
argue  that,  from  the  mid-1960s  through  the  late 
1970s, the Federal Reserve paid excessive attention 
to stabilizing output and employment around levels 
that later proved to have been too high. This policy 
mistake  loosened  inﬂation  expectations  and  gave 
rise  to  the  stagﬂation  of  the  1970s.  The  authors 
believe that the recognition of this error at the end of 
the decade led policymakers to place greater empha­
sis  on  the  stabilization  of  prices  and  of  inﬂation 
expectations. 
Collard and Dellas 
In their paper, ‘‘The Great Inﬂation of the 1970s,’’ 
Collard and Dellas evaluate three alternative expla­
nations of the loose policy of the 1970s: 
Federal  Reserve  Board’s  International  Finance  Discussion  Papers 
(www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2004/default.htm),  the  European 
Central Bank’s Working Paper Series (www.ecb.int/pub/wp/wp.htm), 
and the Center for Financial Research’s CFS Working Paper series 
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1.	Policy  was biased toward creating inﬂation sur­
prises as a means of lowering unemployment (or 
‘‘policy opportunism,’’ for short) 
2.	Policy  reacted strongly to increases in expected 
inﬂation but suffered from erroneous information 
that hid the actual drop in underlying productiv­
ity  growth  and  hence  in  potential  output;  thus, 
policy was only inadvertently loose (‘‘imperfect 
information’’) 
3.	Policy  reacted  weakly  to  increases  in  expected 
inﬂation (‘‘weak reaction to inﬂation’’) 
The authors employ a New Neoclassical Synthesis 
model,  speciﬁed  to  produce  a  unique  equilibrium, 
in which policymakers follow a standard Henderson– 
McKibbin–Taylor rule to set the policy rate. Finding 
the conditions under which such a model will gen­
erate  the  1970s  volatility  in  inﬂation  and  in  other 
macroeconomic variables such as output and invest­
ment,  the  authors  say,  may  indicate  which  of  the 
policy explanations is most relevant. 
In the monetary policy rule, the policy variable set 
by the authority in the present period is a function 
of  three  other  variables:  the  policy  variable  in  the 
preceding period, the inﬂation gap (the gap between 
inﬂation expected in the next period and the steady-
state  rate),  and  the  output  gap  (the  gap  between 
current output and potential output). Potential output 
is not observable, and the monetary authority learns 
only gradually about shocks to it. 
In looking for a speciﬁcation of their model that 
will  reproduce  the  conditions  of  the  1970s,  the 
authors vary the shocks to, and the degree of uncer­
tainty about, potential output and the speed at which 
the  monetary  authority  responds  to  changes  in  the 
inﬂation gap and the output gap. In the ﬁrst (baseline) 
trial, the authors assume a reaction speed about the 
same as that commonly associated with the Volcker– 
Greenspan  era,  that  is,  a  coefﬁcient  of  1.5  on  the 
inﬂation  gap  and  0.5  on  the  output  gap.  (A  value 
of at least 1 for the coefﬁcient on the inﬂation gap 
is  necessary  for  the  model  to  avoid  an  indetermi­
nate equilibrium—that is, the possibility of reaching 
various stable but undesirable economic outcomes.) 
They select a supply shock—a reduction in produc­
tivity growth—sufﬁcient to generate an increase of 
5–6 percentage points in the inﬂation rate. They ﬁnd 
that with a supply shock of about 30 percent and a 
high degree of uncertainty about the output gap, the 
model  produced  the  desired  increase  in  inﬂation. 
Moreover,  this  speciﬁcation  is  quite  successful  in 
predicting the volatility in variables such as invest­
ment,  output,  and  inﬂation.  Its  main  weakness  is 
in its exaggeration of the severity of the predicted 
recession  and  in  its  requirement  of  a  very  large 
shock. 
The authors also examine the performance of the 
model under perfect information and a speciﬁcation 
of  the  Henderson–McKibbin–Taylor  rule  that  con­
tains a reaction to inﬂation that is too weak and thus 
leads to indeterminate equilibriums. This speciﬁca­
tion also performs quite well: It generates a large and 
persistent increase in the inﬂation rate after a large 
productivity  slowdown  (a  supply  shock  of  about 
12  percent)  and  predicts  an  amount  of  macroeco­
nomic volatility comparable to that observed in the 
real world. The main weakness of this speciﬁcation 
is, again, its exaggeration of the severity of the pre­
dicted recession. 
The results from these two speciﬁcations suggest 
that  one  need  not  appeal  to  the  ﬁrst  explanation 
(policy opportunism) to explain the inﬂation of the 
1970s. The results also suggest that it may not be 
possible to discriminate between the second expla­
nation  (substantial  imperfect  information  plus 
strong  reaction  to  expected  inﬂation)  and  the  third 
(good  information  but  weak  reaction  to  expected 
inﬂation)—the  data  lend  considerable  support  to 
both.  The  third  explanation  implies  that  economic 
outcomes  would  have  been  much  better  had  the 
central  bank’s  reaction  to  inﬂation  been  stronger, 
whereas the second explanation implies that, given 
uncertainty about the true output gap, even a strong 
reaction to inﬂation would not have sufﬁced to keep 
inﬂation in check in the face of a very large, unob­
served productivity slowdown. 
Orphanides and Williams 
In  ‘‘The  Decline  of  Activist  Stabilization  Policy: 
Natural Rate Misperceptions, Learning, and Expec­
tations,’’  Orphanides  and  Williams  reexamine  the 
sources  of  U.S.  stagﬂation  in  the  1970s  and  of 
the  subsequent  improvement  in  macroeconomic 
performance. 
The authors trace the policy failure of the 1970s to 
what they term the ‘‘activist’’ approach to macroeco­
nomic policy—the so-called New Economics, which 
became popular during the 1960s. According to this 
approach,  the  management  of  aggregate  demand 
could counteract any shortfalls or excesses relative to 
the economy’s potential and thus attain the dual goals 
of macroeconomic policy: sustained prosperity and 
price stability. The enviable performance of the U.S. 
economy  in  the  ﬁrst  half  of  the  1960s  appeared 
to validate the promise of the New Economics. But 
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purchased at the cost of rising inﬂation; and by the 
1970s, the economy had fallen into stagﬂation—high 
unemployment accompanied by high inﬂation. 
Orphanides and Williams argue that in the 1960s 
and  1970s  the  Federal  Reserve  attempted  a  tight 
stabilization of the unemployment rate near an esti­
mate of the natural rate that was far too low. The 
resulting  gradual  rise  of  inﬂation  adversely  inﬂu­
enced private agents’ expectations, which in turn put 
further upward pressure on prices. This combination, 
rather than only adverse supply shocks such as a drop 
in productivity, explains much of the performance of 
the U.S. economy in the 1970s. That is, the misper­
ception  of  the  natural  rate  caused  policymakers  to 
be far too optimistic about how low they could push 
the unemployment rate without generating inﬂation 
pressures. Policy, inﬂuenced by the New Economics, 
remained  excessively  stimulative  and  contributed 
to rising inﬂation. The rise in inﬂation expectations 
ampliﬁed and propagated this initial policy error and 
led to stagﬂation. 
In  the  authors’  model,  private  agents  have  only 
imperfect knowledge of the structure of the economy 
and of policy, but in a process of perpetual ‘‘learn­
ing,’’ they continually update their beliefs. This learn­
ing process causes the direct effects of policy errors 
to alter inﬂation expectations and thereby to further 
inﬂuence the economy. According to the model, the 
combination of stimulative monetary policy and ris­
ing inﬂation during the late 1960s and 1970s con­
tributed  to  public  confusion  regarding  the  Federal 
Reserve’s  objectives  and  the  behavior  of  inﬂation. 
Inﬂation  expectations  were  initially  well  anchored 
because of the price stability of the 1950s and early 
1960s; but they changed during the late 1960s, when 
policy errors and the resulting rise in inﬂation caused 
them  to  drift  upward.  By  the  time  that  the  supply 
shocks of the 1970s hit, expectations of rising inﬂa­
tion exacerbated the effects of the shocks and contrib­
uted to stagﬂation. 
The authors point out that, although some observ­
ers  suggest  that  monetary  policy  was  inherently 
destabilizing  in  the  pre-1979  period,  the  results  in 
their paper do not rely on such a condition. They note 
that their policy rule for the pre-1979 period, which 
is based on real-time data and forecasts, features a 
response of nominal rates to inﬂation that is greater 
than one-for-one, a result consistent with stability in 
the model economy. 
Orphanides and Williams show that, had monetary 
policy not reacted as aggressively to perceived unem­
ployment gaps as it did, inﬂation expectations would 
have remained stable, and the stagﬂation of the 1970s 
would  have  been  avoided  despite  the  dramatic 
increases in oil prices and the productivity slowdown 
during  that period.  According to  the model, a less 
aggressive reaction to the unemployment gap would 
have  done  a  better  job  of  stabilizing  inﬂation  and 
unemployment in the 1970s. 
By  end  of  the  1970s,  according  to  the  authors, 
monetary  policy  makers  appeared  to  recognize  the 
nature  of  the  problem.  Faced  with  high  and  rising 
inﬂation,  they  changed  course,  turning  away  from 
the  ﬁne-tuning  of  demand  management  advocated 
by the New Economics and concentrating instead on 
the goal of price stability. After the costly disinﬂation 
of the early 1980s, the change in focus contributed 
to  a  new  era  of  relatively  stable  inﬂation  and 
unemployment. 
MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY 
In the conference’s second session, ‘‘Monetary and 
Fiscal Policy,’’  three papers addressed the design of 
optimal policy. In the ﬁrst paper, Pierpaolo Benigno 
and  Michael  Woodford  propose  a  model  that  can 
address  simultaneously  the  basic  policy  problems 
(including  sticky  prices  and  incentives-distorting 
taxes) of the monetary and ﬁscal authorities. In the 
second  paper,  Susan  Athey,  Andrew  Atkeson,  and 
Patrick J. Kehoe consider a compromise between the 
desirability  of  allowing  the  central  bank  discretion 
to act on private information and the desirability of 
preventing  the  central  bank  from  stimulating  out-
put  with  unexpected  inﬂation.  And  in  the  third, 
Jordi Galí, J. David Lo ´pez-Salido, and Javier Valle ´s 
attempt to reconcile the fact that a rise in government 
spending leads to higher consumption with predic­
tions  to  the  contrary  from  neoclassical  theory  and 
real-business-cycle models. 
Benigno and Woodford 
In ‘‘Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy: A Linear-
Quadratic  Approach,’’  Benigno  and  Woodford 
observe  that  models  of  optimal  policy  for  the  two 
types  of  stabilization  are  typically  developed  in 
mutual isolation. Monetary policy models typically 
ignore the consequences of monetary policy for the 
government budget. This approach can be justiﬁed 
under  the  assumption  that  nondistorting  sources  of 
government revenue exist, but it is inappropriate if, 
as emphasized in the literature on optimal tax policy, 
all  available  sources  of  revenue  create  distortions. 
Likewise,  models  of  optimal  ﬁscal  policy  at  most 
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simplifying  assumption  that  prices  are  ﬂexible  and 
hence clear markets, so that tax rates affect output 
without regard to aggregate demand. Investigations 
of optimum monetary policy, however, confront the 
excesses and deﬁciencies created by prices that do 
not immediately adjust. 
The authors propose to determine how the results 
of  these  two  types  of  model  would  need  to  be 
modiﬁed if they are combined as two aspects of a 
single general-equilibrium model and if each aspect 
includes the more realistic concerns of the other. The 
authors point out that they approach the task differ­
ently from some recent papers that have combined 
optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy with sticky prices. 
The differences are that the present paper (1) uses 
staggered  pricing  of  the  sort  appearing  in  models 
with explicit microfoundations and in some empiri­
cal work on the monetary transmission mechanism, 
(2) obtains analytical and not purely numerical results 
by virtue of the linear-quadratic approach, (3) derives 
optimal targeting rules for monetary and ﬁscal policy 
that yield a single rational-expectations equilibrium 
and optimal policy responses to any shock. 
The authors ﬁnd that, in their model, the volatility 
of inﬂation and tax rates is highly sensitive to the 
frequency with which prices change (the degree of 
stickiness). In their baseline case, prices change at 
just  less  than  six-month  intervals  (a  rate  they  say 
is consistent with survey results). Under fully ﬂexible 
prices, the optimal response of inﬂation to a ﬁscal 
shock is eighty times as large as in the baseline case, 
and the long-run tax rate has no response. Even if 
sticky prices adjust as frequently as every ﬁve weeks, 
the optimal response of inﬂation and of the long-run 
tax rate are much closer to those in the baseline case 
than those under fully ﬂexible prices. Likewise, in 
contrast to the monetary policy literature with lump-
sum  taxes,  the  authors  ﬁnd  that,  in  their  model,  a 
government  spending  shock  creating  ﬁscal  stress 
affects the optimal path of inﬂation and the output 
gap. 
The authors set up targeting rules for the monetary 
and ﬁscal authorities in the form of commitments to 
maximize social welfare by adjusting the short-term 
interest rate and the tax rate, respectively. And each 
authority simultaneously makes the projected paths 
of inﬂation and the output gap (the target variables) 
satisfy  the  attainment  of  a  unique,  nonexplosive, 
rational-expectations equilibrium. Both monetary and 
ﬁscal policy can be used to stabilize an output gap 
that  measures  the  perturbations  from  sticky  prices 
and from distortionary taxes (taxes that are scaled to 
some payer variable such as income and that there-
fore inﬂuence, or distort, the payer’s economic deci­
sions); and ﬁscal policy can be used to address inﬂa­
tion because distortionary taxes affect real marginal 
costs  and  thus  aggregate  supply.  Hence,  monetary 
policy should take account of the requirements for 
government solvency, and ﬁscal policy should attend 
to its inﬂuence on inﬂation. 
Athey, Atkeson, and Kehoe 
In ‘‘The Optimal Degree of Monetary Policy Discre­
tion,’’  Athey, Atkeson, and Kehoe note that, accord­
ing  to  most  of  the  academic  literature,  there  is  no 
justiﬁcation for policy discretion unless the central 
bank has important private information, information 
not available to the private sector. Acting to maxi­
mize  social  welfare,  the  central  bank  achieves  the 
best outcomes when it follows a rule based on pub­
licly observable data. There is scope for debate about 
the optimal degree of discretion if the central bank 
does  have  information.  The  question  is  this:  How 
much  risk  of  policy  opportunism  (boosting  output 
through  inﬂation  surprises)  should  be  tolerated  to 
allow the central bank discretion to act on its private 
information? 
In the authors’ model, the central bank has private 
information on the state of the economy that deter-
mines  society’s  preferred  level  of  inﬂation.  If  this 
state is low, society desires low inﬂation; if it is high, 
society desires high inﬂation. In each period, private 
agents set their nominal wages before the monetary 
authority sets the inﬂation rate. This timing gives the 
central bank an incentive to engineer surprise inﬂa­
tion to reduce real wages and thereby lower unem­
ployment toward its optimal level. 
The optimal policy takes the form of an inﬂation 
cap. The beneﬁt of reducing the cap is a decrease 
in  the  latitude  for  policy  opportunism.  The  cost  is 
a decrease in the scope for the central bank to use 
its private information to stabilize the economy. The 
cap  is  chosen  low  enough  so  that  the  cost  of  any 
further reduction just matches the beneﬁt. One inter­
pretation of the cap is that it is the optimal inﬂation 
target. 
The main theoretical contribution of the paper is to 
make clear what information is required to choose the 
optimal (time-varying) inﬂation cap. It is remarkable 
that under some common assumptions the level of the 
cap depends only on the central bank’s report on the 
current state of the economy. Otherwise it depends on 
reports on both current and past states. 
The  main  practical  contribution  is  to  forcefully 
restate the argument that the case for central bank 
discretion  rests  on  the  assumption  that  the  central 
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Galí,L o ´pez-Salido, and Valle ´s 
In  most  macroeconomic  models,  say  Galí,L o ´pez-
Salido,  and  Valle ´si n  ‘‘Understanding  the  Effects 
of  Government  Spending  on  Consumption,’’  a  rise 
in government purchases of goods and services will 
tend to expand output. But the strength of that ten­
dency  varies  greatly  across  types  of  models.  The 
differences  are  rooted  in  alternative  assumptions 
about  how  consumers  react  to  the  rise  in  current 
income attributable to the rise in government spend­
ing.  In  neoclassical  (real-business-cycle,  or  RBC) 
models, consumers are assumed to spend according 
to  a  measure  of  their  lifetime  resources.  A  further 
common assumption is that, when government spend­
ing  rises,  these  consumers  will  look  ahead,  in 
so-called Ricardian fashion, and anticipate that the 
present value of their after-tax lifetime income will 
fall because taxes will rise at some point to ﬁnance 
the higher government spending. Their anticipation 
of lower future income causes them to reduce their 
consumption  immediately.  But  the  supply  of  labor 
grows, real wages fall, and employment and output 
grow. 
In  traditional  Keynesian  models,  consumers  are 
not forward looking. They spend according to their 
current disposable income rather than their estimate 
of lifetime resources. Thus, an increase in govern­
ment spending can directly increase output because 
higher demand from government need not be offset 
by  lower  demand  from  consumers.  If  the  higher 
government spending is sufﬁciently ﬁnanced by bor­
rowing, it raises consumer income and is thus aug­
mented by an increase in consumer demand. If the 
money supply is ﬁxed, interest rates rise and invest­
ment  falls;  in  contrast,  an  accommodation  of  the 
output expansion by the central bank will, depending 
on the extent of the policy easing, moderate or elimi­
nate the investment decline. 
In a review of the empirical evidence and through 
an investigation of their own, the authors ﬁnd that, 
indeed,  a  rise  in  government  spending  leads  to  a 
signiﬁcant  increase  in  consumption  and  to  little 
change,  or  a  fall,  in  investment.  They  propose  a 
general  equilibrium  model  in  which  Ricardian  and 
non-Ricardian  consumers  coexist  and  prices  are 
sticky. The authors argue that both price stickiness 
and  the  existence  of  non-Ricardian  consumers  are 
necessary for an increase in government spending to 
raise consumption. Price stickiness lowers markups 
and allows real wages to rise along with employment; 
in  turn,  non-Ricardian  consumers  will  respond  to 
their higher income by increasing their consumption. 
The authors ﬁnd that, for plausible settings for the 
proportion of non-Ricardian consumers, the degree 
of price stickiness, and the extent of debt ﬁnancing, 
their model’s results accord with empirical ﬁndings. 
The  model  assumes  that  the  taxes  imposed  to 
ﬁnance the rise in government spending are lump-
sum, that is, they are the same dollar amount for each 
taxpayer.  The  authors  leave  to  future  research  the 
question of how the model would respond if taxpayer 
liability varied with income. 
INTERNATIONAL LINKAGES 
The conference’s third session, ‘‘International Link-
ages,’’  featured three papers on the consequences of 
various economic policies and market structures in 
open economies. Nicoletta Batini, Paul Levine, and 
Joseph Pearlman look for the conditions under which 
central banks in open economies could effectively set 
policy according to a rule based on expected inﬂa­
tion.  Tamim  Bayoumi,  Douglas  Laxton,  and  Paolo 
Pesenti consider the efﬁciency gains in the industrial 
countries  that  could  be  expected  from  an  increase 
in  competition  among  businesses  and  workers  in 
the  euro  area.  And  Michael  Ehrmann  and  Marcel 
Fratzscher  investigate  whether  the  interdependence 
of  the  U.S.  and  euro-area  money  markets  has 
increased since the advent of the European Economic 
and Monetary Union in 1999. 
Batini, Levine, and Pearlman 
Much  work  has  been  devoted  to  modeling  closed 
economies in which the monetary authority changes 
interest  rates  in  response  to  changes  in  expected, 
rather  than  current,  inﬂation.  Such  policy  behavior 
matches  that  in  the  inﬂation-forecasting  models 
maintained  at  the  central  banks  of  Canada  and 
New Zealand and appears to be consistent with recent 
monetary  policy in  the United States and  the euro 
area. A criticism of a rule that responds to expected 
inﬂation is that of indeterminacy—it can lead to any 
of several equilibriums, some of which have undesir­
able outcomes for household welfare. In ‘‘Indetermi­
nacy with Inﬂation-Forecast-Based Rules in a Two-
Bloc Model,’’  Batini, Levine, and Pearlman extend 
existing work on indeterminacy under such rules to 
the case in which economies are open. 
Their study uses a New Keynesian (that is, sticky 
nominal wages and prices) general equilibrium model 
based on microeconomic foundations with two coun­
try blocs. In each bloc the monetary authority follows 
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model  includes  two  features—habit  persistence  in 
consumption and backward-looking wage and price 
indexing—to  improve  its  ability  to  mimic  ﬂuctua­
tions in output, prices, and nominal interest rates in 
the euro area and the United States; and it includes 
one feature—home bias in consumption patterns— 
that improves its tracking of real exchange rate ﬂuc­
tuations  between  the  two  blocs.  The  authors  show 
that if the monetary authorities respond to inﬂation 
forecasts  too  far  ahead,  the  IFB  rule  produces  an 
indeterminate equilibrium no matter how aggressive 
the  response  is.  They  also  ﬁnd  that  indeterminacy 
arises more readily in an open economy than in a 
closed one. Finally, they ﬁnd that indeterminacy in an 
open economy is more likely if the monetary authori­
ties  respond  to  expected  consumer  price  inﬂation 
rather than to expected producer price inﬂation. 
The authors consider the results arising from alter-
native choices of inﬂation horizons and of inﬂation 
indexes for use in the policy rule to be an important 
warning for the central banks of the United States 
and the euro area. The reason is that both authorities 
seem to focus primarily on medium-term consumer 
price inﬂation expectations, thereby compounding the 
possibility of indeterminacy. 
Bayoumi, Laxton, and Pesenti 
Overregulation in Europe’s product and labor mar­
kets is currently a leading explanation for the euro 
area’s lower income per capita relative to the United 
States,  and  the  reduction  of  such  impediments  has 
become  a  major  policy  topic  in  Europe.  Bayoumi, 
Laxton, and Pesenti employ a version of the Global 
Economy Model (GEM) of the International Mone­
tary Fund to examine the potential beneﬁts from such 
deregulation.  GEM  provides  for  imperfect  compe­
tition  through  markups  in  prices  and  wages  above 
marginal  costs  and  marginal  output;  the  markups 
decrease as the substitutability of goods and inputs 
(that is, competition) increases. In the authors’ two-
bloc  version  of  GEM,  one  bloc  is  calibrated  with 
euro-area data, and the other, which represents the 
rest  of  the  industrialized  world,  is  calibrated  with 
U.S. data. 
The resulting study, ‘‘When Leaner Isn’t Meaner: 
Measuring Beneﬁts and Spillovers of Greater Compe­
tition  in  Europe,’’  simulates  greater  competition  in 
the  euro  area  by  lowering  euro-area  markups  in 
the  model  to  the  level  of  those  in  United  States. 
With  greater  competition,  businesses  and  workers 
in the euro area are less able to restrict their respec­
tive supplies. Accordingly, output and consumption 
increase strongly in the euro area; in the rest of the 
industrialized world, output increases somewhat, and 
consumption  increases  more  than  output  because 
of an improvement in the terms of trade. Moreover, 
the authors show that, because greater competition 
improves the ﬂexibility of wages and prices in the 
euro area, the central bank there faces an improved 
tradeoff between inﬂation and the output gap. 
The markups employed in the model are based on 
empirically  estimated  data  from  both  the  United 
States and Europe, and the simulation results cover 
ten years. The authors emphasize that the quantitative 
results  represent  only  an  initial  estimate  subject  to 
further reﬁnements. These results show that, over the 
ten-year  period,  euro-area  output  per  capita  rises 
about 121⁄2 percent above baseline (the level of out-
put  per  capita  if  markups  are  not  changed),  and 
U.S.-calibrated  output  rises  about  1  percent  above 
baseline. The combined result closes about one-half 
of the per capita output gap between the two blocs. 
Euro-area consumption per capita rises about 8 per-
cent  above  baseline.  Accounting  for  the  disutility 
of  the  rise  in  labor  effort,  welfare  increases  about 
21⁄2  percent. Consumption and welfare in the other 
bloc rise about 11⁄4  percent because of an improve­
ment in the terms of trade with the euro area. Finally, 
the tradeoff facing the euro-area monetary authority 
also improves because of a one-third reduction, rela­
tive to baseline, in the sacriﬁce ratio—the amount of 
output lost by lowering inﬂation 1 percentage point. 
Robustness checks indicate that the effect on the euro 
area  economy  is  relatively  invariant  to  alternative 
assumptions about key parameters but that the spill-
overs to the rest of the world are sensitive to these 
assumptions. 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher 
An extensive literature has documented the inﬂuence 
of  domestic  economic  news  on  domestic  interest 
rates and asset prices. In ‘‘Equal Size, Equal Role? 
Interest Rate Interdependence between the Euro Area 
and  the  United  States,’’  Ehrmann  and  Fratzscher 
investigate the international extent of such inﬂuence 
by  looking  at  economic  news  and  the  behavior  of 
interest rates in Germany and the United States from 
1993  through  1998  and  in  the  euro  area  and  the 
United States from 1999 through February 2003. The 
paper  attempts  to  measure  the  degree  to  which 
foreign news moves ﬁnancial markets and whether 
U.S.  and  European  ﬁnancial  markets  have  become 
more  interdependent  since  the  1999  launch  of  the 
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examining the correlation of announcements of eco­
nomic fundamentals in the two regions, the authors 
also assess whether greater ﬁnancial interdependence 
reﬂects a broader increase in economic interdepen­
dence between the two regions. 
In studying daily money market rates for the 1993– 
2003  period,  the  authors  ﬁnd  that  money  market 
linkages have strongly increased with the arrival of 
the  EMU.  During  trading  hours,  the  changes  in 
money market rates in the euro area generally spill 
over to the United States and vice versa. Although 
developments  in  one  market  are  not  completely 
reﬂected in the other market, the linkage is highly 
signiﬁcant in statistical tests. Moreover, the EMU has 
changed  this  relationship  between  markets  in  two 
dimensions.  First,  the  systematic  reaction  of  U.S. 
markets  to  developments  in  Europe  can  be  found 
only with the start of the EMU. Through statistical 
testing methods, this increased linkage can be dated 
to June 1998, the time by which markets were certain 
that the EMU would become a reality. Second, the 
extent  to  which  market  movements  in  the  United 
States are reﬂected in the euro-area money market 
has  increased.  This  effect,  too,  is  linked  with  the 
formation of the EMU. 
The  authors  go  beyond  the  linkages  that  can  be 
observed  each  trading  day  to  study  the  extent  to 
which markets react to the release of macroeconomic 
news or monetary policy decisions in the other econ­
omy.  European  markets  are  found  to  react  to  cer­
tain macroeconomic news about the U.S. economy. 
This phenomenon can be identiﬁed particularly for 
releases of U.S. data on retail sales, consumer conﬁ­
dence, industrial production, and the survey from the 
National Association of Purchasing Management— 
that  is,  mostly  announcements  that  are  known  as 
leading indicators for the U.S. economy. Importantly, 
this reaction of euro-area money markets started only 
with the advent of the EMU. 
The results raise the question of why the U.S. and 
euro-area money markets have become so much more 
interdependent  and,  in  particular,  why  some  U.S. 
news has become an important determinant of euro­
area interest rates. This ﬁnding may reﬂect growing 
real integration and interdependence between the two 
economies. A second interpretation ties the result to 
the timing of the news releases in each economy— 
U.S.  macroeconomic  news  is  released  signiﬁcantly 
ahead of the corresponding news in Germany and the 
euro  area.  Testing  for  this  hypothesis,  the  authors 
show  that  U.S.  announcements  have,  over  time, 
become  strong  leading  indicators  for  the  euro-area 
economy. Accordingly, investors in recent years may 
be paying increasing attention to U.S. news to learn 
about  the  prospects  of  the  euro-area  economy.  In 
short, according to the authors, their ﬁndings suggest 
that  the  U.S.  and  euro-area  money  markets  have 
become signiﬁcantly more interdependent since the 
start of the EMU, a development at least partly due to 
an  increase  in  the  real  integration  of  the  U.S.  and 
euro-area economies in recent years. 
OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY 
The fourth and ﬁnal session of the conference, ‘‘Opti­
mal Monetary Policy,’’  featured two papers. In the 
ﬁrst paper, Robert G. King and Alexander L. Wolman 
investigate the problem of multiple equilibriums un­
der a discretionary monetary policy. In the second, 
Ester Faia and Tommaso Monacelli consider optimal 
monetary policy in a world in which policymakers in 
each country have an incentive to improve the wel­
fare of domestic residents by manipulating the terms 
of trade in their own favor. 
King and Wolman 
Those  who  advocate  policy  rules  criticize  discre­
tionary  monetary  policy  mainly  because,  through 
attempts to stimulate output with surprise policy eas­
ings, it leads to higher average inﬂation than does a 
policy rule. In neoclassical models, such attempts can 
be futile because private-sector agents come to expect 
the behavior; as a result, inﬂation is higher, but out-
put remains essentially unchanged. The inﬂationary 
bias  of  discretionary  monetary  policy  can  also  be 
derived from New Keynesian models, in which out-
put is inefﬁciently low because of imperfect compe­
tition, prices are set for a ﬁxed length of time, and 
agents have differing repricing schedules (staggered 
pricing). 
In  their  paper,  ‘‘Monetary  Discretion,  Pricing 
Complementarity,  and  Dynamic  Multiple  Equilib­
ria,’’  King and Wolman demonstrate, in a New Key­
nesian setting, that besides producing high inﬂation, 
discretion has a further adverse consequence. It can 
produce  multiple  equilibriums  that  lead  to  excess 
volatility in prices and output because of changing 
beliefs of private agents. The volatility arises because 
forward-looking price setting by ﬁrms interacts with 
discretionary  behavior  by  a  monetary  authority 
attempting to maximize private welfare. 
In  the  authors’  model,  ﬁrms  set  prices  for  two 
periods by applying a markup to their nominal mar­
ginal costs in the current period and their expected 
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period, one-half of all ﬁrms set their prices, and the 
other half hold them steady at the level set in the 
preceding period. Optimal behavior on the part of the 
discretionary  monetary  authority  implies  that  it 
chooses the size of the money stock in each period to 
be proportional to prices set by ﬁrms in the previous 
period. 
If ﬁrms resetting prices in the current period expect 
the money supply to be higher in the next period, 
they will raise their prices because the increase in the 
money stock in the next period will act to increase 
their nominal marginal costs in the next period. The 
expectation  of  a  higher  money  stock  can  be  self-
fulﬁlling because the monetary authority will increase 
the stock in the next period precisely because prices 
were  raised  in  the  current  period.  Hence,  besides 
discretionary policy’s having an inﬂationary bias, the 
interaction of beliefs and discretionary policy sets off 
inefﬁcient ﬂuctuations in economic activity. 
Faia and Monacelli 
In ‘‘Ramsey Monetary Policy and International Rela­
tive  Prices,’’  Faia  and  Monacelli  examine  optimal 
monetary  policy  in  a  two-country  New  Keynesian 
model  (sticky  prices,  imperfect  competition).  The 
authors use a Ramsey framework, familiar from the 
optimal-taxation literature, which, they note, is not 
often deployed in analyses of monetary and exchange 
rate policy in open economies. The Ramsey approach 
allows the authors to consider a much more general 
speciﬁcation  of  household  preferences  than  pre­
viously considered. Moreover, the authors incorpo­
rate  a  dynamic  speciﬁcation  of  price-setting  that 
affords them a more coherent framework for assess­
ing the beneﬁts of policies that are set according to 
rules rather than discretion. 
In the authors’ model, policymakers maximize the 
welfare  of  domestic  residents  subject  to  the  con­
straints of the competitive economy. Because prices 
are  sticky,  policymakers  in  each  country  have  an 
incentive to implement policies that manipulate the 
terms of trade in their own country’s favor (that is, 
improve the domestic tradeoff between consumption 
and production by raising the price of home goods 
relative to that of foreign goods). 
The  authors  show  that  the  equilibrium  behavior 
that emerges when domestic policymakers act in such 
an uncoordinated manner is quite different from that 
which would obtain if a single ‘‘world social plan­
ner’’  formulated  policy  for  the  two  countries.  In 
particular, prices are much less stable than if there 
were a world social planner. Moreover, only under 
the  coordinated  policy  would  both  countries  target 
the  same  allocation  of  resources  that  would  occur 
under ﬂexible prices. 
The authors indicate three restrictions of the model 
that could be amended in future work to allow more 
realistic adjustments in the current account: (1) The 
law of one price holds continuously, (2) households 
fully  share  risk  via  international  ﬁnancial  markets, 
and (3) households invest in only ﬁnancial, not physi­
cal, assets. 
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